Abstract: This paper presents a flavor of OT named Independent Oblivious Transfer in the Public-Key Public-Randomness Model (PKPR IOT, in short), with respect to the open problem given by De Santis. First it gives a non-interactive implementation of IOT, which can independently and obliviously transfer polynomial messages. The implementation is based on Quadratic Residuosity Assumption. Since it is limited to pre-fixed times, then another non-interactive implementation of IOT is presented, which can independently transfer messages for any times. The second implementation requires the sender to be honest and the receiver couldn't make his choice independently. So, the third interactive implementation is given. It is based on the BBCS oblivious transfer scheme of Rivest, and is rather more efficient than the above two non-interactive counterparts. All the three implementations presented are secure against receivers with unlimited computational power.
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Introduction
Since Rabin [1] first introduced oblivious transfer (OT) into cryptography in 1981, OT has been widely used in cryptography and becomes an important cryptographic primitive. It has already become the basis for realizing interactive protocols, such as bit commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, and general secure multiparty computation, and etc. [2, 3] OT refers to several types of two-party protocols. One party is the sender named Alice, who has a string s to be sent, and the other party is the receiver named Bob. At the end of an execution of OT protocol, Bob either learns the string or gets nothing about s, and each of the two events happens with the same probability. However, Alice cannot figure out better than randomly guessing that whether Bob learns the string or not. In 1989, Bellare and Micali [4] presented a non-interactive implementation of Oblivious Transfer based on Discrete Log Assumption that is secure with respect to an all-powerful sender and a probabilistic polynomial-time receiver.
There are great deals of variants of OT, such as 1-out-of-2 OT, k-out-of-n OT, committed OT, concurrent OT and etc. They have been studied extensively [4−9] and have been used in lots of cryptographic protocols [3, 10] . Among all the variants, we are most concerned with the 1-out-of-2 OT. The notion of 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer was devised by Even, Goldreich, and Lempel [11] . A 1-out-of-2 OT is from Alice whose input consists of two strings, s 0 and s 1 , to Bob who has a bit meaning which message to receive. At the end of an execution of the 1-out-of-2 OT,
Bob only knows exactly one of the two strings, s 0 or s 1 , and Alice can only guess with probability 1/2 which string of the two Bob gets. De Santis et al. presented a non-interactive implementation of 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer in the PKPR Model in 1995, which relies upon the quadratic residuosity assumption and is secure against receivers with unlimited computational power [12] .
The PKPR Model is a certain kind of model in which all the users share a random common string, choose and validate by themselves their own public and private keys without interacting with the other users. It doesn't need any trusted center to protest against possible "cheating" by users.
Zero-knowledge proof is used in their implementation, which is a cryptographic primitive as well. It was formalized by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [13] . The proof system De Santis et al. used in their implementation is called non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proof System [14] .
Their implementation can execute efficiently, but there is still a disadvantage, that is, for every transfer, the choice of Bob to receive a message is always the same. We cannot use this implementation to independently and obliviously transfer many pairs of messages with the same public information. If we need to obliviously transfer multi-pairs of messages, a naive method is to simply use their implementation of 1-out-of-2 OT repeatedly for multi-times. The result is that Bob will receive all the messages from the same channel. Then Alice can guess the channel from which Bob receives the messages in an all-or-nothing fashion, which is the same as that of a single OT. Here we want the channel Bob receives messages from to be independent and unpredictable to Alice at each time. If Alice learns Bob's choice during some OT without knowing Bob's secret, it doesn't make any good for Alice to know his counterpart's choices during other former or later transfers. Another way to implement this is that before every 1-out-of-2 OT, Bob publishes a new public file which consists of all the public information, and generates new corresponding secret information. Then from which channel Bob receives a message will be different every time. However, the frequent changes of public information will be costly and inconvenient.
In this paper, we present a flavor of OT named Independent Oblivious Transfer in the Public-Key Public-Randomness Model (PKPR IOT). And to our knowledge, there has been no previous work on independent OT. With a PKPR IOT, the two parties can independently and obliviously transfer multi pairs of messages efficiently, without worrying about that information leakage for some or other OT will threaten the security of other : 1017 OT's, supposed that Bob's secret keys are still unrevealed to Alice. First we give a non-interactive implementation, within which Alice and Bob can independently transfer polynomial messages. Due to its limitation to polynomial times, we then present another non-interactive implementation within which the two parties could independently transfer messages for any times. But the sender is required to be honest and the receiver's choice is not made totally on his own. Thus, we give a third interactive implementation. It needs an initialization step which is done once for all. This implementation is much more efficient than the other two. Compared with the OT scheme in Ref. [12] , our first two implementations are at least the same efficient, and the third scheme is much more efficient. All the three schemes own the additional property of independence.
In the next section, we mainly give some preliminary knowledge which will be used in IOT and introduce PKPR OT presented by De Santis et al. In Section 3, we present the Independent Oblivious Transfer in the PKPR Model, and give three implementations of it, two non-interactive and one interactive, along with the security and efficiency analysis of them. Conclusion about our work is given in Section 4.
Preliminaries

Basic notations
We denote by |x| the length of x if x is a string, the length of the binary string representing x if x is an integer, or the absolute value of x if x is a real number. By the expression x||y we denote the concatenation of x and y if they are both strings.
We say that a function f() is negligible if for all constants c, there exists an integer n c such that for all integers
is a probabilistic algorithm with one input parameter, then for any input x, the notation A(x) refers to the probability space that assigns to the string σ the probability that A, on input x, outputs σ. If S is a probability space, then "x←S" denotes the algorithm which assigns to x an element randomly selected according to S.
If p(·,·,…) is a predicate, the notation Pr[x←S;y←T;…;p(x,y,…)] denotes the probability that p(x,y,…) will be true after the ordered execution of the algorithms {x←S; y←T;…}.
Facts
A multitude of concepts and definitions in this paper are the same as those in Ref. [12] . Here we only list some facts. 
Oblivious transfer
OT was first introduced by Rabin [1] , who gave an implementation based on the difficulty of factoring. OT is a protocol for two parties: the sender named Alice who has a string s to send, and the receiver named Bob. Both of the following two events are equally likely to occur at the end of an execution of the protocol: either Bob learns the string s, or Bob gets nothing about s. Moreover, at the end of the execution, Alice cannot tell with a non-negligible advantage whether Bob gets s or not.
Bellare and Micali [4] presented in 1989 a non-interactive implementation of OT based on Discrete Log
Assumption that is secure with respect to an all-powerful sender and a probabilistic polynomial-time receiver.
A variant of OT is the 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer, which was introduced by Even, Goldreich, and Lempel [11] . In this protocol, Alice has two strings s 0 and s 1 receive with a quite high probability.
2.
Verifiability: If Bob generates the public file and private key correctly, the test whether the public file is valid can be passed with very high probability.
3.
1-out-of-2: There is no way for Bob to construct a public file that has a non-negligible probability of being declared valid by Verify and that allows Bob to obtain information on both strings sent by Alice.
4.
Obliviousness: Alice has no way to guess better than at random that which of the two channels is open (in another word, Alice cannot know which of the two strings is received by Bob).
The detail of the implementation given by De Santis et al. is in Ref. [12] . They put forward an open problem in that paper, that is, how to use the same public file to transfer multi-messages at the end of each transfer, and from which channel a message Bob gets is independent. With respect to the problem, we present Independent Oblivious
Transfer, whose detail is given in the next section.
Independent Oblivious Transfer
Independent oblivious transfer
We say an oblivious transfer is independent, if which of these two channels is open at each transfer is different and independent. Even if the adversary (usually Alice) knows Bob's choice during some or other transfer, without the knowledge of Bob's secret keys, he still cannot figure out Bob's choices during other transfers better than randomly guessing. Hence, which of the two channels is open to Bob at each OT is unpredictable for Alice. A PKPR IOT should satisfy not only the above four conditions which a PKPR OT should satisfy, but also the property of independence.
If we simply repeat the 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer using the same public file, this method is only partially content to the requirements of the above open problem. However, the channel Bob gets messages from will be the same during each transfer. That is, Bob will either get all the messages from Ch 0 or learn all the messages from Ch 1 .
If Alice knows which channel Bob gets the message from during a certain 1-out-of-2 OT, it means that Alice will know all the choices of Bob during all the transfers, no matter before or after that. The probability that Alice can figure out successfully all the channels open to Bob during the whole multi OT's is 1/2, exactly the same with that in a single OT. That is, Alice can succeed in an all-or-nothing fashion. In our implementation which is presented in the following, the probability that Alice guesses successfully for all OT's that which of the two channels is open will be reduced to 1/2 k , where k is the number of OT's. Even if Alice knows which channel Bob gets the message from in some or other 1-out-of-2 OT, he will have no better way than randomly guessing to know Bob's choices in : 1019 the 1-out-of-2 OT's before or after that, supposed that Bob's private key is still secret to Alice. Of course, if Alice knows Bob's private key, he will know all Bob's choices with probability 1.
Another method to independently and obliviously transfer multi-messages is to use a single complete 1-out-of-2 OT for each pair of messages. Before transferring a pair of messages, Bob generates a new public file including new channels, and a new corresponding secret key. Alice then uses the new channels for oblivious transfer messages. Obviously, at each time which of the two channels is open will be different and independent, but the frequent changes of public files and secret keys will be costly and inconvenient. It will waste much bandwidth.
First non-interactive implementation
Here, we present a scheme within which we can independently and obliviously transfer polynomial pairs of messages using the same public file.
This implementation of independent oblivious transfer is non-interactive in the PKPR model, which is based on that of De Santis et al. [12] . It needs a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system (A,B) for the language of pairs (x,y), where x is a Blum integer and y is a quadratic non residue modulo x. (A,B) for moduli of length n needs a reference string σ of n 3 bits. Moreover, the program of the prover A can be performed in probabilistic polynomial time provided that the factorization of x is available. In our implementation, the GM encryption system [15] is used as well, which was also used in Ref. [12] . And we still follow the denotation GM_E, GM_D to denote the encryption and decryption of GM system. Receive is the same with that in Ref. [12] .
We denote by Alice the Sender and Bob the Receiver respectively. They share a reference string σ. Alice and Bob first agree on an integer k in advance, which denotes the number of messages to be transferred and is polynomial in n (otherwise, the whole process cannot be done in polynomial time). Bob then constructs two 
Algorithm 1. Key_Generator(σ,k).
Input: An n 3 -bit reference string σ and an integer k;
1. Construct channels and secret keys.
Randomly select two n-bit primes p, q≡3 mod 4, and set x=p*q.
Randomly select y∈NQR x and z 1 ,z 2 ,…,z k ∈ .
Run the algorithm A on input (x,y) using the reference string σ and obtaining Proof as output. Output: If all checks are successfully passed, then output VALID, else INVALID.
Algorithm 3. Send(Ch,s,j).
Input: A channel Ch=(x,v), a binary string s and an integer j(1≤j≤k);
Output: msg=GM_E(x,v/z j mod x,s)||j.
Algorithm 4. Receive(Key,msg).
Input: A key Key=(p,q) and a message msg;
Output: s=GM_D(msg,p,q).
Now
, we are going to analyze the security and efficiency of this non-interactive implementation of independent oblivious transfer.
Security
Theorem 1. Under the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, the above quadruple of algorithms (Key_Generator,
Verify,Send,Receive) is a PKPR Oblivious Transfer.
Note: The proof of Theorem 1 is similar to that in Ref. [12] . For the sake of clarity, we give a whole proof here, including the parts that are the same with those in Ref. [12] .
Proof: First of all, the above algorithms all run in polynomial time. Notice that, in the algorithms Key_Generator and Receive, the factorization of x is known.
Meaningfulness: Now, as y is a quadratic non-residue, then by Fact 2, exactly one of z and zy mod x is a quadratic non-residue and thus, by the properties of the encryption scheme, the corresponding string s i will be read by the receiver.
Verifiability: If the two channels are constructed by the Key_Generator algorithm, then x is a Blum Integer, each of z 1 ,z 2 ,…,z k has Jacobi Symbol +1 modulo x and y is a quadratic non-residue modulo x. Since z=z 1 *z 2 *…* z k mod x, according to Fact 2, z has Jacobi Symbol +1 as well. Thus it follows from the completeness of (A,B) that
Verify will output VALID with overwhelming probability.
1-out-of-2: Suppose that there exists an algorithm that violates the 1-out-of-2 condition. Two cases need to be considered. If y is a quadratic non-residue modulo x and x is a Blum integer, then, by Fact 2, one of z and zy is a quadratic residue modulo x. Thus, for the properties of the encryption scheme GM_E, no information about the string encrypted with a quadratic residue can be obtained from its encryption.
Suppose now that y is a quadratic residue modulo x or that x is not a Blum integer. In this case, for the soundness of the proof system (A,B), it follows that with a high probability, the algorithm Verify will output As (A,B) is a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system, there exists an efficient simulator algorithm S for (A,B). On inputing a pair (x,y), where x is a Blum integer and y is a quadratic non-residue modulo x, S generates a pair (σ,Proof) where σ is a random string of n 3 bits and Proof has the same distribution of A's output on the inputs σ and (x,y).
We exhibit an algorithm Q(·,·) that decides quadratic residuosity using Adv and S as subroutines. The following is the formal description of Q(·,·).
Algorithm 5. Q(x,z).
Input: x∈BL(n), z∈ ; 
If k is odd, set b=b′; else set b=1−b′.
Output: b.
Next we are going to compute Pr[x←BL(n);k←poly(n);z←
. Thus any string sent using channel Ch 1 will be received by Bob. As Adv guesses b with probability at least 1/2+n −d , in this case, since z 1 ,z 2 ,…,z k−1 are quadratic non residue modulo x, if k is odd, then the quadratic residue of z modulo x is the same as that of z′; otherwise, the quadratic residue of z modulo x is just opposite to that of z′. So the algorithm Q will return the correct quadratic residue of z modulo x with a probability the same as that of Adv. The same reasoning applies to the case QR x (z)=0. Therefore, for some d>0 and infinitely many n,
which contradicts the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption.
Next, we prove that this implementation satisfies the independence property. Proof: When Alice sends a pair of messages, he randomly selects a distinct j from the set {1,2,…,k}, and then computes z′=z/z j mod x. Since j is different at each time, z′ is different as well. Therefore, the channel from which Bob gets message is different. Because which of the two channels is open depends on the quadratic residuosity of z′ and z 1 ,z 2 ,…,z k are independently chosen, from which channel Bob gets a message at each time will be independent as well.
Combined the above two theorems, we can say our implementation is really a PKPR IOT.
There is one thing we need to say more. This implementation is secure against receivers with unlimited computational power. Since y is a quadratic non-residue modulo x, by Fact 3, we have that either z*y or z is a quadratic residue modulo x. It also holds for z*y/z j and z/z j . In a GM bit encryption GM_E (x,v,c) , where c is a bit to be encrypted, the encryption of c is r 2 v c mod x, where r is a randomly selected number in . If v is a quadratic
The Key_Generator step requires additional k−1 chooses of z i and the computation of z, which can be done in polynomial time. The Verify step requires additional verification of the validity of z. The other verifications are the same with those of Ref. [12] . Both the two steps are a little more costly than those of Ref. [12] , but they are in a once-and-for-all fashion. During the following k transfers, both parties can directly use the public file and secret key which are generated during this step, and Alice doesn't need to verify Bob's public file before every transfer.
While sending a pair of messages, what Alice needs to do additionally is to choose a distinct j from {1,2,…,k}.
When receiving a message, what Bob needs to do additionally is to extract a j from the processed messages and check that whether this j is ever used before. There are efficient algorithms to do these. The additional workload is much lower than that of regenerating a new public file and corresponding secret key. Our implementation saves a certain bandwidth of communication.
With the above discussion, we can say that our implementation of PKPR IOT is more efficient than simply using a single complete 1-out-of-2 OT for each pair of messages.
This implementation of PKPR IOT can be used to oblivious transfer multi-messages independently, but it is limited to polynomial times and it's only partially content to our need. Hence, we present another non-interactive implementation, within which we can obliviously transfer messages for any times independently. In the implementation, the sender is required to be honest and behave according to the protocol.
Second non-interactive implementation Honest-Sender PKPR IOT
This implementation implements to obliviously transfer any number of messages independently between the two parties. In this independent oblivious transfer, we require that the sender is honest and behaves totally in accordance with the protocol, so we also call it honest-sender IOT.
Key Generation and algorithm Verify are exact the same with those in Ref. [12] . The public key of Bob is z, whose quadratic residuosity b is unknown to Alice. Bob's private key is the factorization of x, p and q. In order to send message s 0 and s 1 to Bob through channels (x,v 0 ) and (x,v 1 ), Alice first randomly selects r from , and sets Input: An n 3 -bit reference string σ and an integer k;
Randomly select two n-bit primes p,q ≡ 3 mod 4, and set x=p*q.
Randomly select y∈NQR x and z∈ . 
Algorithm 9. Receive(Key,msg).
Input: A key Key=(p,q) and a message msg;
Security
The security analysis is similar to that of the first non-interactive implementation. Meanfulness and Verification can easily be checked. If Alice is honest, she randomly selects r from . By Fact 3, we know that only one of z*r
and z*y*r is quadratic non-residue modulo x. Hence, Bob can only get one of the two messages, for he knows p and q, the factorization of x. 1-out-of-2 property is satisfied. Since the factorization of x is unknown to her, according to quadratic residuosity assumption, Alice could not know the quadratic residuosity of z better than randomly guessing, as well as the quadratic residuosity of r. So, she could not know which channel is open to Bob with non-negligible advantage. This satisfies the obliviousness condition. During each transfer, r is independently and randomly chosen by Alice, therefore, QR x (r)⊕b differs each time. Independence property is also met. As the same with the first implementation, this scheme is also secure against receivers with unbounded power.
Efficiency
The efficiency is almost the same with that of Ref. [12] , except one random selection, one multiplication and one quadratic residuosity computation plus for each transfer. Hence, we can say, this implementation is almost as efficient as that of Ref. [12] .
Interactive implementation
The above second non-interactive implementation has its own advantage than the first one, but still, there is some drawbacks with it. First, the sender Alice needs to be honest and behave totally according to the protocol.
Otherwise, Alice may suit herself to choose r. Similarly, she selects a random number w from and sets r=w 
Security
Given that the PKPR oblivious transfer used in this scheme is secure, we can say, this scheme is also secure. Supposed that Bob's secret is kept private, even if Alice knows the c in some transfer, all the c's in other transfers are still safe for Bob. Obliviously, this interactive scheme is secure against receivers with unbounded power as well.
Efficiency
The SETUP step could be done in a once-for-all fashion. It is the initialization of the whole independent oblivious transfer scheme. Once it is done, the parameters can be used for all the later message transferring. In each transfer, there are only four exclusive or operations. Thus, we say, this scheme is rather more efficient than the above two schemes.
Conclusion
In this paper, we define an independent oblivious transfer and present three implementations of IOT in the PKPR Model, two non-interactive and one interactive. The first non-interactive implementation can be used to independently and obliviously transfer messages for pre-fixed polynomial times. It only satisfies our need partially.
The second non-interactive implementation can satisfy our need of oblivious transferring for any number of times, : 1025 whereas, the sender is required to be honest and the receiver could not make his choice totally on his own. Then, we present the third implementation which is interactive. The two parties cooperate to initialize the independent oblivious transfer scheme first, and then they can interactively and obliviously transfer messages for any times they wish. Compared with the OT scheme in Ref. [12] , our first two implementations are at least almost the same efficient, and the third scheme is much more efficient than that in Ref. [12] . Besides, all the three schemes own the additional property of independence.
